Refusing to quash a case registered under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act), the Allahabad High Court observed that the POCSO Act is a “special statute” and any offence under this Act cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise.
A bench of Justice Samit Gopal referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Narinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2014) where, while discussing the high court’s power under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), it was held that the power to quash a case is not be exercised in cases that involve offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
The single-judge bench pointed out that in the case at hand, along with charges under Sections 376 and 313 of Indian Penal Code (IPC), the offence under Section 3/4 POCSO Act had also been alleged. Therefore, it held that for the POCSO Act is a “special statute”, the case could not be quashed on the basis of compromise.
An application under Section 482 CrPC was filed before the high court to quash a sexual assault case. The sole ground for seeking the relief was that subsequent to lodging of the First Information Report (FIR), conclusion of investigation, and summoning of the accused, a compromise had been entered into between the alleged victim and the accused.
The high court was informed that an affidavit had also been filed by the victim/prosecutrix before the trial court along with a copy of the said compromise deed for the court to decide the matter in terms of the said compromise.
To plea for quashing the present matter, the counsel for the accused relied upon an order dated June 6, 2023, passed by a co-ordinate bench of the high court where a case under Sections 363, 366, 376 (2N), 506 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act had been quashed. The counsel argued that similarly, the proceedings in the present case could also be quashed.
However, the plea was opposed by the counsel representing the State government. He submitted that when the sexual assault began, the victim was a minor, aged around 15, and as per the FIR, the sexual assault continued for three years. He contended that in such a case, a compromise could not be entertained.
The high court noted that in the judgment referred by the counsel for the accused, the court had found the victim a major and held that no case under the POCSO Act was made out.
On the contrary, in the present case, there is no dispute regarding the age of the victim and the fact that she was a minor at the time of the incident, court stressed.
The court referred to the cases of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) and Narinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2014) and said that while deciding the application for quashing of FIR on the ground of compromise, the court is under obligation to consider the nature and gravity of the offence.
“…where the applicant is facing Trial for an offence punishable under the Special Statute, then the prosecution cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise,” the court held.
Further, the court highlighted that where the prosecutrix is a minor below 18 years of age, her consent would be immaterial.
“When an offence is made out against the accused irrespective of the fact that whether the prosecutrix was a consenting party or not, then certainly, the prosecution cannot be quashed merely on the ground that at a later stage the prosecutrix has entered into a compromise,” it said.
The court asserted that once the consent of the minor prosecutrix is immaterial for registration of offence, then such consent shall remain immaterial for all practical purposes at all the stages including for compromise.
Therefore, while noting that in the case at hand, the sections as charged against the accused were not compoundable, the high court dismissed the plea to quash the entire proceedings in the case.
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